McGrath versus Dawkins debate audio

[stumpjumper]

http://theologica.blogspot.com/2007/03/mcgrath-vs-dawkins-online.html

You can download the podcast above and listen to the debate. Anyone interested in discussing it?

I plan to listen to it later on today...

[stumpjumper]

Listening to it now, I find Dawkins' critique of morality not coming from religion (even though he admits science has nothing to say about ethics) to be a false dichotomy.

He seems to be conflating "religion" or religious ethics with moral commands that are found in the Bible. He argues that since we "pick and choose" which commands or laws to follow that our morals do not come from religion or theism.

I fail to see how that takes into account an abstractionist perspective in regards to morality. Christianity would say "do all things in love". Well love is both relative and concrete and is going to be applied differently depending upon the circumstances.

In fact, I would argue that looking at moral systems as deriving from a self-sacrificing and altruistic force such as love which pervades the universe is just about the only way to make sense of morality in terms that can be both subjective and concrete...

Off to listen to part II...

[seebs]

In general, I think a lot of people never have any vision of "morality" other than big list of rules.

The canonical definitions are teleological ethics (aka utilitarianism and such), deontological ethics (big list of rules, "duty-based"), and virtue-based ethical systems.

I believe Christianity offers a virtue-based ethical system. It is neither a Big List of Rules ("anoint Jesus with $20,000 worth of perfume" or "sell perfume and use the money for the poor") nor a purely outcome-driven system ("you should take the action that serves the most people" or "you should take the action that most-praises God"), but rather, a virtue-based system; you should act out of love, and however that works out, you were acting in love.

[Danhalen]

...you should act out of love, and however that works out, you were acting in love.I am probably not going to listen to the debate, and I don't have an apologetic to offer here, but I thought I'd recommend Nel Nodding's book, Caring. There's a subtitle too, bt I forget what it is at the moment. Anyway, she takes a feminist approach to ethics (care ethics), and builds a strong case. It's not perfect by any means, but it is a great read. Her ethical theory fills both secular and religious people's need for a workable ethical system. The comment I quoted from you really reflects Nodding's main thrust in her argument. She goes into good detail on definitions as well. Anyway, Just thought I'd share.

[stumpjumper]

Finished listening to the debate (I would actually call it more of a discussion and I liked the friendly dialogue)...

Anyway, I still find the same problems in Dawkins' approach which is shared in his latest book and that is that he really just doesn't know much about theology and/or understand faith. He constantly conflates religion with theism and his views on such things like miracles and faith are rather elementary and self-serving.

He defined a miracle as something which violates a natural law and faith as belief without evidence. Neither of them are accurate definitions. What is ironic is that he defends the fact that he does not know theology by saying there's no need to study what kind of cotton is used to make the emporers pants since the emporer wears no clothes.

I would say if he studied and understood theology a little better he might be able to make better arguments. McGrath was a little dismissive IRT the questions about other religions and I hoped he would have addressed the section about miracles and faith a little better...

[David Gould]

I think Dawkins' point about not bothering with theology is simply this: theologians make many different claims. If we eliminate all the claims that are internally logically incoherent, we are still left with a fair number of competing claims.

However, we are then stuck ... because there is no way to test these claims to see whether in fact they are true or not.

Further than that, before we even bother with trying to work out God's nature we need to work out whether the existence of a deity is likely.

And there simply is no evidence for a deity.

Now, I understand that the vast majority of people have reasons to believe that a deity exists - the vast majority of people are theists of some kind, after all. However, these reasons for believing are personal ones - experiences, feelings, thoughts and so forth. As they are personal reasons, they are fine for the individuals who have them. But they are - in general - not useful for other people who do not have them.

In my opinion, arguing whether the son precedes from the father when we have not even worked out if the existence of a son or a father is likely is a tad pointless ...

[seebs]

I only sort of agree. Without agreeing on what we think "a deity" is, we have no way of determining whether or not there's evidence.

Furthermore, I tend to go about it the other way. We have lots of people talking about an experience. Usually, we take that to mean that they are experiencing something, so the question is, what are they experiencing? What are its qualities?

Theology is the study of whatever it is that people are calling "God". Whether it's hallucinations or an omnipotent Creator, something is clearly up.

[David Gould]

I only sort of agree. Without agreeing on what we think "a deity" is, we have no way of determining whether or not there's evidence.



Then when theists agree on what a deity is, we can move on. ;)



Furthermore, I tend to go about it the other way. We have lots of people talking about an experience. Usually, we take that to mean that they are experiencing something, so the question is, what are they experiencing? What are its qualities?



And the experiences are all interpreted in different ways by different theologians, with there being no way to test between those interpretations. So what is the point?



Theology is the study of whatever it is that people are calling "God". Whether it's hallucinations or an omnipotent Creator, something is clearly up.

The problem here is that theology makes the assumption that these experiences are God, and then tries to work out what God is. Why make that initial assumption? That is why I think that theology has it backwards. Before you build an elegant proof for why transubstantiation cannot occur based on the nature of God ... how about showing some evidence for deity?

[David Gould]

As to the debate, I have listened to part of Dawkins talk and he is not that crash hot in this one, really. I think he rambled too much. Lack of preparation for the talk on his book made him seem unfocused. He sidetracked himself with the talk about Christian children, imo. Hopefully, the debate part of it will be better targetted - although it seems as though it could simply be a friendly discussion about this and that, rather than a debate on a particular question.

[David Gould]

Not that there is anything wrong with a friendly chat, of course. :)

[seebs]

And the experiences are all interpreted in different ways by different theologians, with there being no way to test between those interpretations. So what is the point?

No perfectly reliable way to test. We can test between them, we just can't always be sure that our test was correct.

The problem here is that theology makes the assumption that these experiences are God, and then tries to work out what God is. Why make that initial assumption? That is why I think that theology has it backwards. Before you build an elegant proof for why transubstantiation cannot occur based on the nature of God ... how about showing some evidence for deity?

I assume that these experiences are something. Within that framework, I can develop a case for arguing whether or not the concept of "God" makes sense, whether "God" is supernatural or just a characteristic of brain function...

You can make it a fair way, but you have to start with some kind of framework. I think the theological framework works well.

[stumpjumper]

And there simply is no evidence for a deity.

Now, I understand that the vast majority of people have reasons to believe that a deity exists - the vast majority of people are theists of some kind, after all. However, these reasons for believing are personal ones - experiences, feelings, thoughts and so forth. As they are personal reasons, they are fine for the individuals who have them. But they are - in general - not useful for other people who do not have them.


I don't see how it is true that there is no evidence for a deity.

Strict evidentialists like Dawkins seem to redefine evidence to mean "scientific truths" which pretty much KO's a deity before the match...

Why are not experiences evidence?

Why are not inductions from natural arguments evidence?

Why are not holistic philosophical views that posit theism considered evidence?

How do we define evidence?

[David Gould]

They talk past each other a little bit here. Alistair is discussing the order of the universe and how the existence of that order needs to be explained. Dawkins is talking about how science can explain the order.

In other words, Alistair is talking about how the very explicability of the universe arises, which is something that Dawkins missed.

[David Gould]

I don't see how it is true that there is no evidence for a deity.

Strict evidentialists like Dawkins seem to redefine evidence to mean "scientific truths" which pretty much KO's a deity before the match...

Why are not experiences evidence?

Why are not inductions from natural arguments evidence?

Why are not holistic philosophical views that posit theism considered evidence?

How do we define evidence?

I would define evidence as something that enables us to determine which possible explanation for something is more likely. In other words, it must be linked to a methodology.

Scientific evidence is linked to the scientific method.

These other things that you raise do not seem to me to be linked to a method.

[stumpjumper]

Why should methodology necessarily be defined in terms of science?

[David Gould]

Why should methodology necessarily be defined in terms of science?

It does not have to be. However, no-one has ever presented me another methodology which works. (by 'works' I mean, 'Enables us to eliminate possible explanations') Do you have such a methodology?

[stumpjumper]

I think we have to look at the fields of inquiry and determine our evidence accordingly.

What evidence is there for secular humanism?

Is evidence a term that means anything when considering the claims of secular humanism?

I don't equate Christianity with secular humanism in regards to evidence provided and claims made but it does make a point, IMO...

[stumpjumper]

Why should methodology necessarily be defined in terms of science?

It does not have to be. However, no-one has ever presented me another methodology which works. (by 'works' I mean, 'Enables us to eliminate possible explanations') Do you have such a methodology?

I tend to not look so much for "explanations" maybe... Explanations tend to reflect a look for an answer to a "how" question which I feel that science is very good at supplying....

I don't believe we need to stick with that focus on determinng our views on other issues...

[David Gould]

I think we have to look at the fields of inquiry and determine our evidence accordingly.

What evidence is there for secular humanism?



Secular humanism seems to me to be a world view. You can examine specific claims that are part of that world view and evaluate them in terms of evidence. One of those, of course, is that there is no reason to believe that there is a deity. I think that claim is evidenced.



Is evidence a term that means anything when considering the claims of secular humanism?



Yes.



I don't equate Christianity with secular humanism in regards to evidence provided and claims made but it does make a point, IMO...

Okay.

[David Gould]

I tend to not look so much for "explanations" maybe... Explanations tend to reflect a look for an answer to a "how" question which I feel that science is very good at supplying....

I don't believe we need to stick with that focus on determinng our views on other issues...

What I mean by 'eliminating explanations' is determining whether, for example, Islam or Christianity or Wicca or Hinduism is more likely to be true. If there is no way to distinguish between two claims then we have a problem. As far as I can see, no methodology other than science has enabled us to distinguish between claims.

[stumpjumper]

I think we have to look at the fields of inquiry and determine our evidence accordingly.

What evidence is there for secular humanism?



Secular humanism seems to me to be a world view. You can examine specific claims that are part of that world view and evaluate them in terms of evidence. One of those, of course, is that there is no reason to believe that there is a deity. I think that claim is evidenced.



Is evidence a term that means anything when considering the claims of secular humanism?



Yes.



I don't equate Christianity with secular humanism in regards to evidence provided and claims made but it does make a point, IMO...


So what makes something like Christianity more open to ridicule and argumentation from someone like Dawkins than secular humanism?


Why do claims that involve deities come under such special consideration from this new brand of atheists?

I guess that is my question really. Why is Dawkins so concerned with how I justify my faith? I really don't understand the motivation behind what I would simply call fundamentalist atheists.

That does not include you David, btw.

Why should the evidence of secular humanists and say non-theistic existentialists not come under the same scrutiny as liberal Lutherans?


I'll take my answer tomorrow :)

[stumpjumper]

As far as I can see, no methodology other than science has enabled us to distinguish between claims.

I don't know if that is true.

What about ethics? How does science determine what is and is not ethical?

Even Dawkins would agree that this is a question outside of the realm of science.

I must go to bed now. Baby was up since 4 yesterday....

[David Gould]

I don't know if that is true.

What about ethics? How does science determine what is and is not ethical?

Even Dawkins would agree that this is a question outside of the realm of science.

I must go to bed now. Baby was up since 4 yesterday....

I agree that this is outside the realm of science. However, there is no methodology that enables us to determine whether killing babies is right or not. We can build an argument that works provided other people agree with the premises. But if they do not, then it does not help.

Morality is the same as beauty. There is no 'right'. There is simply opinion. If you want to argue that religion is in the same category, you will not find me disagreeing too much ... ;)

[David Gould]

So what makes something like Christianity more open to ridicule and argumentation from someone like Dawkins than secular humanism?






Why do claims that involve deities come under such special consideration from this new brand of atheists?

[/quote]

I would argue that communism also comes under such consideration. But I would also say: people cannot tackle everything. Secular humanism is not a powerful force in the world. Theism is.



I guess that is my question really. Why is Dawkins so concerned with how I justify my faith? I really don't understand the motivation behind what I would simply call fundamentalist atheists.



Because he thinks that your belief is wrong and that people should not believe things without justification.



That does not include you David, btw.



You should note that in many ways I am not too far removed from Dawkins. Perhaps I am just politer. :)


Why should the evidence of secular humanists and say non-theistic existentialists not come under the same scrutiny as liberal Lutherans?

I'll take my answer tomorrow :)

They should. But why should Richard Dawkins be the one to do it? He is examining theism; someone else can look at existentialists. However, I would argue that looking at existentialists is not really that important at this point in time. There are many more theists than there are existentialists, after all. :)

[stumpjumper]

I disagree that what is "right" is simply opinion but it's not really that important here... I would say that love is both subjective and absolute in some ways...


Why should the evidence of secular humanists and say non-theistic existentialists not come under the same scrutiny as liberal Lutherans?

I'll take my answer tomorrow :)

They should. But why should Richard Dawkins be the one to do it? He is examining theism; someone else can look at existentialists. However, I would argue that looking at existentialists is not really that important at this point in time. There are many more theists than there are existentialists, after all. :)

Indeed and here is where the circularity of someone like Dawkins' position manifested. He believes the question of God (indeed every question actually) is a question of science. If you place the justification and the methodology for determining what is true and false under the realm of the experimentation and study of our natural world you obviously can only justify one philosophical position and worldview.

His arguments are completely circular because the ONLY worldview that will be consistent with his premises and methodology is metaphysical naturalism.

Empiricism is going to be just about the only philosophical perspective that can be justified with this view of the world then...

[seebs]

Science can't eliminate claims in the face of people who are committed to them anyway, or who practice bad science. Consider that there are people who are genuinely convinced that the moon landings were faked.

Ethical systems can prove or disprove ethical claims. Now, we can't prove which system is right, but... So what? We can't do that in many fields, but we can come to working observations of how different systems interact.

I guess, it doesn't bother me that I can't have definitive proof on moral claims. It is more useful to have a moral system than not to, and indeed, it's absolutely inevitable.

[David Gould]

Indeed and here is where the circularity of someone like Dawkins' position manifested. He believes the question of God (indeed every question actually) is a question of science. If you place the justification and the methodology for determining what is true and false under the realm of the experimentation and study of our natural world you obviously can only justify one philosophical position and worldview.

His arguments are completely circular because the ONLY worldview that will be consistent with his premises and methodology is metaphysical naturalism.

Empiricism is going to be just about the only philosophical perspective that can be justified with this view of the world then...

Then give me some other methodology. That is my key argument: there is no method other than methodological naturalism to examine any claim.

If that leaves theistic claims out in the cold, then theists have to provide some other method. They never have. And then they complain that the naturalistic method is biased against them. It ... annoys me somewhat.[/i]

[David Gould]

Science can't eliminate claims in the face of people who are committed to them anyway, or who practice bad science. Consider that there are people who are genuinely convinced that the moon landings were faked.

Ethical systems can prove or disprove ethical claims. Now, we can't prove which system is right, but... So what? We can't do that in many fields, but we can come to working observations of how different systems interact.

I guess, it doesn't bother me that I can't have definitive proof on moral claims. It is more useful to have a moral system than not to, and indeed, it's absolutely inevitable.

I am not talking about proof. I am talking about a methodology by which one ethical system can be evaluated against another. There is no such methodology.

I agree that it is inevitable to have a moral system. I do not see how that helps any, though.

[seebs]

I am not talking about proof. I am talking about a methodology by which one ethical system can be evaluated against another. There is no such methodology.

There are several. However, we can't necessarily be sure which one is right.

I agree that it is inevitable to have a moral system. I do not see how that helps any, though.

What it means is that we must decide.

So saying "we can't have the total certainty we would like in our decision" changes nothing. We're going to have to use an uncertain methodology.

There is no non-self-referential way to choose between empiricism and random guessing. What are we going to do, check the results? That presupposes empiricism!

As it happens, I think empiricism works great for a very narrow set of problems; those in which we have already defined the inputs and outputs.

For other problems, we may be stuck with just talking things out and trying to intuit what seems "most reasonable". Not as certain? Too bad.

In short, that we can't offer anything better is, IMHO, the reason we are forced to accept what we do have available. If a convenient methodology for selecting between means of judging ethical claims were consistently available, we'd be done.

[David Gould]

I am not talking about proof. I am talking about a methodology by which one ethical system can be evaluated against another. There is no such methodology.

There are several. However, we can't necessarily be sure which one is right.



We have no methodology to sort between methodologies.

I agree that it is inevitable to have a moral system. I do not see how that helps any, though.

What it means is that we must decide.
[/quote]

Yes.



So saying "we can't have the total certainty we would like in our decision" changes nothing. We're going to have to use an uncertain methodology.



Science is not total certainty, either. I do not ask for total certainty. I ask for a methodology that, like methodological naturalism, has a very good chance of reducing error over time.



There is no non-self-referential way to choose between empiricism and random guessing. What are we going to do, check the results? That presupposes empiricism!



The way we check is what works. In other words, if using one method gives us control over our universe and the other does not, the first method is better.

We have tried random guessing. We have tried methodological naturalism. We know which one works better.



As it happens, I think empiricism works great for a very narrow set of problems; those in which we have already defined the inputs and outputs.

For other problems, we may be stuck with just talking things out and trying to intuit what seems "most reasonable". Not as certain? Too bad.

In short, that we can't offer anything better is, IMHO, the reason we are forced to accept what we do have available. If a convenient methodology for selecting between means of judging ethical claims were consistently available, we'd be done.

I am saying there is no methodology at all. It is all just opinion with no basis to it. There are reasons why we hold certain opinions and not others, of course. But there is no methodology to determine which is more likely to be correct - theologically or ethically.

And the reason why I think that this is the case is that theology and ethics are not speaking of anything at all. There is no such thing as right and wrong, and that is the reason why we cannot work out whether a particular action is right or wrong. There is no such thing as deity, so trying to work out whether Islam or Christianity is correct is an impossibility - theology incorrectly assumes the existence of deity; morality incorrectly assumes the existence of right and wrong.

And this is why no methodology can be presented.

[seebs]

Science is not total certainty, either. I do not ask for total certainty. I ask for a methodology that, like methodological naturalism, has a very good chance of reducing error over time.

Well, I think we're doing fine with "we talk about morality, propose principles, discuss cases, and talk to the people affected to see how that's working out for them".

It's been working, and I think we have a couple thousand years of track record showing improvement.

The way we check is what works. In other words, if using one method gives us control over our universe and the other does not, the first method is better.

We have tried random guessing. We have tried methodological naturalism. We know which one works better.

Only assuming our empirical method! We can't test empiricism by anything but empiricism.

I am saying there is no methodology at all. It is all just opinion with no basis to it.

I disagree. I think there's a real basis, and the continued convergence of moral exploration seems to me to uphold this.

There are reasons why we hold certain opinions and not others, of course. But there is no methodology to determine which is more likely to be correct - theologically or ethically.

Sure there is!

In fact, there are several. And, in fact, they tend to converge over time.

And the reason why I think that this is the case is that theology and ethics are not speaking of anything at all.

I don't think the premise is true, but even if it were, I don't think this conclusion would follow.

I think the strongest supportable claim is that we haven't got good measurements yet; that doesn't prove nonexistence.

And this is why no methodology can be presented.

I present for your consideration Corporate Discernment.

It is a documented methodology, and it produces good results. Not perfect results, subject of course to revision... but results nonetheless, and ones that give us a basis for picking answers and pursuing further inquiry.

[David Gould]

On what basis should I pick corporate discernment?

[seebs]

On what basis should I pick corporate discernment?

The same basis on which you picked the scientific methodology. It works; it yields results, it offers a basis for distinguishing between theories, and the theories it picks consistently work well. It offers not only a way to pick from competing claims, but a way to refine claims or determine whether to reject them.

Keep in mind, there's a couple of layers of "basis" to pick from. I'm sort of an instrumentalist about science; it's a tool. We use it because it gives us answers, and mostly when we use science to pick answers, we don't die. Corporate discernment is a tool at the level of "scientific method", not a particular set of answers at the level of "fundamentalist Christianity" or "Catholicism". It is a way to go about finding answers to moral questions (and some theological questions).

It produces answers, and the answers pass important tests. For instance, in general, it tends to lead the curve on moral developments.

It's a methodology for making decisions, and it offers a proven track record. Good enough. We have a methodology, now we can use it and start doing some work.

[David Gould]

My suspicion would be that you like the methodology because it throws up moral outcomes that you agree with. What would your answer be to that suspicion?

[seebs]

My suspicion would be that you like the methodology because it throws up moral outcomes that you agree with. What would your answer be to that suspicion?

It hasn't worked that way thus far. Corporate discernment has an unusually high rate of rejecting commonly accepted views in favor of views which become commonly accepted later.

Corporate discernment was the process that was involved in the massive Quaker shift to firm abolitionism. This was a process which was, to many people, unthinkable or at the least uncomfortable.

Many beliefs that have come from corporate discernment were uncomfortable or difficult for me to consider seriously at first. I am by nature inclined to collect shinies; the notion of simple living is one I dismissed as ludicrous at first.

That I tend to agree with outcomes when they are developed this way is not necessarily a significant criticism; after all, I tend to agree with empirical results, once I've done the tests!

In fact, that the process is of its nature persuasive is probably one of its strengths. It doesn't just give you an answer; it gives you an exploration of an issue which tends to make it easier to have justified confidence in an answer.

In any event, it seems to offer a definite improvement over competing alternatives, and I suggest that, imperfect though it may be, it is the best currently available.

[David Gould]

My suspicion would be that you like the methodology because it throws up moral outcomes that you agree with. What would your answer be to that suspicion?

It hasn't worked that way thus far. Corporate discernment has an unusually high rate of rejecting commonly accepted views in favor of views which become commonly accepted later.

Corporate discernment was the process that was involved in the massive Quaker shift to firm abolitionism. This was a process which was, to many people, unthinkable or at the least uncomfortable.


Many beliefs that have come from corporate discernment were uncomfortable or difficult for me to consider seriously at first. I am by nature inclined to collect shinies; the notion of simple living is one I dismissed as ludicrous at first.

That I tend to agree with outcomes when they are developed this way is not necessarily a significant criticism; after all, I tend to agree with empirical results, once I've done the tests!



I was not asking that question, though. My suspicion was that corporate discernment threw up answers to which a priori you were already inclined to hold. If you were not inclined to hold them a priori, that holes my suspicion.



In fact, that the process is of its nature persuasive is probably one of its strengths. It doesn't just give you an answer; it gives you an exploration of an issue which tends to make it easier to have justified confidence in an answer.



Can you give me an idea of what you mean by 'justified confidence' in this regard?



In any event, it seems to offer a definite improvement over competing alternatives, and I suggest that, imperfect though it may be, it is the best currently available.

On what scale are you measuring definite improvement? In science, we have the yardstick of, I guess, 'predicting and controlling stuff'.

[seebs]

I was not asking that question, though. My suspicion was that corporate discernment threw up answers to which a priori you were already inclined to hold. If you were not inclined to hold them a priori, that holes my suspicion.

I don't think I was.

And, for that matter, if CD consistently puts up beliefs that everyone was inclined to hold a priori, but often goes contrary to other popular systems, this may even be an argument in its favor! :)

Can you give me an idea of what you mean by 'justified confidence' in this regard?

Corporate discernment does a fair job of eliminating many sources of error in my attempts to evaluate moral questions. The individual biases of participants are often ruled out, but the process does not always seem to uphold collective biases, because it explicitly affirms the reality that a single person may be the only one to be right on an issue.

On what scale are you measuring definite improvement? In science, we have the yardstick of, I guess, 'predicting and controlling stuff'.

Corporate discernment tends to produce "improved" morality in that other systems will generally catch up to it. I think there is real improvement and development in human moral systems over time; CD seems to be a good way to figure out about the next step forwards we can make.

[David Gould]

I don't think I was.

And, for that matter, if CD consistently puts up beliefs that everyone was inclined to hold a priori, but often goes contrary to other popular systems, this may even be an argument in its favor! :)



That may well be the case. However, I was more interested in whether you personally liked CD because it answered moral questions in ways that a priori you agreed with - in other words, 'I think racism is bad, and so does CD.' (individual instances like this would not be an issue, but if it was pretty much, 'I think a, b, c, d, e, f, g .... y, z, and CD pops out the same answers,' then there could well be a problem.


Corporate discernment does a fair job of eliminating many sources of error in my attempts to evaluate moral questions. The individual biases of participants are often ruled out, but the process does not always seem to uphold collective biases, because it explicitly affirms the reality that a single person may be the only one to be right on an issue.



However, this assumes that the biases do not reflect reality, so to speak. What if, for example, it really is the case that white people are intrinsically morally inferior to black people? If you do not take that into account in the process, you are liable to throw up the wrong answer.



Corporate discernment tends to produce "improved" morality in that other systems will generally catch up to it. I think there is real improvement and development in human moral systems over time; CD seems to be a good way to figure out about the next step forwards we can make.

I like you see real improvement. Living in the West in the 21st century is better than any of the alternatives. But that is my opinion.

Many others instead see a moral decline - indeed, it is one of the cornerstones of some versions of Christianity that the world is in moral decline. They see, for example, feminism, environmentalism, homosexuality, pro-choice and so forth as evidence that we are worse morally today than we were in the past. What if they are correct? What if women should be at home having babies? What if homosexuals should be executed?

[David Gould]

One other question occurs to me: what if the CD process threw up a moral rule such as, 'Homosexuals should be executed?' Would you accept that moral rule or reject in in favour of the belief that you already hold?

[seebs]

That may well be the case. However, I was more interested in whether you personally liked CD because it answered moral questions in ways that a priori you agreed with - in other words, 'I think racism is bad, and so does CD.' (individual instances like this would not be an issue, but if it was pretty much, 'I think a, b, c, d, e, f, g .... y, z, and CD pops out the same answers,' then there could well be a problem.

CD does not necessarily pop out the same answers for the same people. It tends to lead to a converging set of answers over time.

However, this assumes that the biases do not reflect reality, so to speak. What if, for example, it really is the case that white people are intrinsically morally inferior to black people? If you do not take that into account in the process, you are liable to throw up the wrong answer.

Corporate discernment is not exclusively driven by the expectations or beliefs of the participants.

Many others instead see a moral decline - indeed, it is one of the cornerstones of some versions of Christianity that the world is in moral decline. They see, for example, feminism, environmentalism, homosexuality, pro-choice and so forth as evidence that we are worse morally today than we were in the past. What if they are correct? What if women should be at home having babies? What if homosexuals should be executed?

Then my moral system is wrong. However, that's not the question on the table, any more than the question on the table for comparing the scientific method to cargo cult techniques is "but what if life really is a dream".

This is a methodology for picking some conclusions over others. I favor it because it does not appear to have the key vulnerabilities that many other processes have historically shown -- such as a militant opposition to any revision in light of new experience or data, or a tendency to uphold the convenience of groups that are in power.

One other question occurs to me: what if the CD process threw up a moral rule such as, 'Homosexuals should be executed?' Would you accept that moral rule or reject in in favour of the belief that you already hold?

This is a question that is fairly close in significant ways to "what if you could prove logically that humanism required you to execute homosexuals".

My own leadings on issues related to this have consistently been otherwise. I would certainly make this known, and I might choose to speak at some length in opposition to the apparent conclusion, because it so firmly contradicts a number of other leadings which have been tested at some length and found fruitful.

I don't think the question is entirely meaningful.

[David Gould]

CD does not necessarily pop out the same answers for the same people. It tends to lead to a converging set of answers over time.



Fair enough.



Corporate discernment is not exclusively driven by the expectations or beliefs of the participants.



Okay.



Then my moral system is wrong. However, that's not the question on the table, any more than the question on the table for comparing the scientific method to cargo cult techniques is "but what if life really is a dream".

This is a methodology for picking some conclusions over others. I favor it because it does not appear to have the key vulnerabilities that many other processes have historically shown -- such as a militant opposition to any revision in light of new experience or data, or a tendency to uphold the convenience of groups that are in power.



But it seems to me that you must have already used a moral judgment in this regard. In other words, you think that a system that tends to uphold the convenience of those groups that are in power is wrong. By what methodology did you arrive at that conclusion?



This is a question that is fairly close in significant ways to "what if you could prove logically that humanism required you to execute homosexuals".



Then I would reject humanism - which demonstrates to me that I do not use humanism to determine my morals. And I suspect that the same holds true for you - if CD produced a result that morally repulsed you, you would reject CD.



My own leadings on issues related to this have consistently been otherwise. I would certainly make this known, and I might choose to speak at some length in opposition to the apparent conclusion, because it so firmly contradicts a number of other leadings which have been tested at some length and found fruitful.

I don't think the question is entirely meaningful.

I do - I think it points to the fact that our morals are not determined by methodologies.

[seebs]

But it seems to me that you must have already used a moral judgment in this regard. In other words, you think that a system that tends to uphold the convenience of those groups that are in power is wrong. By what methodology did you arrive at that conclusion?

By the consistent agreement of a broad variety of ethical systems. The vast majority of ethical systems conclude, no matter their methodology, that harming people for personal gain is generally wrong. Many systems, however, have no checks and balances to prevent people from voting themselves a pay raise. Corporate discernment seems to resist this.

Then I would reject humanism - which demonstrates to me that I do not use humanism to determine my morals. And I suspect that the same holds true for you - if CD produced a result that morally repulsed you, you would reject CD.

Most likely, I would first use it to explore what went wrong. Corporate discernment allows for and acknowledges that, in some cases, we will make poor decisions.

Given this, and the actual track record, I would guess that any case in which it somehow concluded that we should execute gays, would be an instance where something identifiable went wrong.

I do - I think it points to the fact that our morals are not determined by methodologies.

Not, in any event, entirely by the methodologies we use to explore them.

But that's fine. So far as I can tell, some amount of moral sense is inherent in nearly all humans. Corporate discernment represents an attempt to get from that to intersubjective verification and some kind of usable defense against the common failure modes.

[David Gould]

By the consistent agreement of a broad variety of ethical systems. The vast majority of ethical systems conclude, no matter their methodology, that harming people for personal gain is generally wrong. Many systems, however, have no checks and balances to prevent people from voting themselves a pay raise. Corporate discernment seems to resist this.

Most likely, I would first use it to explore what went wrong. Corporate discernment allows for and acknowledges that, in some cases, we will make poor decisions.

Given this, and the actual track record, I would guess that any case in which it somehow concluded that we should execute gays, would be an instance where something identifiable went wrong.



And you would think this because you a priori believe that executing gays is wrong. In other words, if the methodology throws up an answer you disagree with, your first thought is that something has gone wrong with the methodology - indicating that your a priori moral beliefs hold more weight with you than the methodology. Why wouldn't your first thought, for example, be that you were wrong about not executing gays?

[seebs]

And you would think this because you a priori believe that executing gays is wrong. In other words, if the methodology throws up an answer you disagree with, your first thought is that something has gone wrong with the methodology - indicating that your a priori moral beliefs hold more weight with you than the methodology. Why wouldn't your first thought, for example, be that you were wrong about not executing gays?

Because any time a methodology suddenly tells me to discard an answer reached through that same methodology, I assume I've done something wrong.

Keep in mind that many of my current positions were arrived at through some variant of this. I have multiple separate instances of this methodology leading me to believe that I should not harm people.

[Glass*Soul]

seebs: what you're calling corporate discernment, I learned to call consensus. It's the same thing, but you do a far better job of explaining and defending it, so I'll not butt in on this part of the topic.

I do want to say something about evidence.

I don't see how it is true that there is no evidence for a deity.

Strict evidentialists like Dawkins seem to redefine evidence to mean "scientific truths" which pretty much KO's a deity before the match...

Why are not experiences evidence?

Why are not inductions from natural arguments evidence?

Why are not holistic philosophical views that posit theism considered evidence?

How do we define evidence?

I'm fine with calling individual experiences, inductions and holistic philosophical views evidence. My problem begins when certain of the religious amongst us begin wielding the conclusions they've drawn from this sort of evidence as if they were scientifically evidenced claims. They are not. No one is necessarily bound by these conclusions, not even the individual who has reached them.

When we use this sort of evidence, which I will admit nealry all (if not all) of us do, it calls for extreme humility and...well...careful and frequent use of the consensus process. Even then we can't really say if we're wrong or right--only that it seems to be (or to have been) working or not working.

Whoops. Sorry. :oops:

[seebs]

There is a subtle difference between the Quaker and Menonnite practice called "consensus" and the more general use of the term, which is the potential for a single person to "stand in the way" of a decision. A pure consensus process would normally say that five strongly in favor, one strongly against, is still consensus. It does weigh the fervency of positions, but doesn't quite have as much willingness to say "well, we haven't figured out yet".

[Glass*Soul]

There is a subtle difference between the Quaker and Menonnite practice called "consensus" and the more general use of the term, which is the potential for a single person to "stand in the way" of a decision. A pure consensus process would normally say that five strongly in favor, one strongly against, is still consensus. It does weigh the fervency of positions, but doesn't quite have as much willingness to say "well, we haven't figured out yet".

Indeed. Five strongly for vs one strongly against isn't consensus in the Mennonite tradition. At that point, if you have one person still saying, "You aren't hearing me. I feel deep misgivings about this," you don't have consensus.

If you have one person saying, "I'm not truly in favor of this, but I feel I've been heard out and understood and I have a certain trust in the five of you and am genuinely willing to try it your way," then you might have consensus. As you say, even then the group could decide not to decide yet.

If they do, the cool thing is that the consensus is going to be informed by the misgivings of the one out of six. That might keep the project out of trouble in the long run, as all parties are going to be at least somewhat invested in detecting the feared difficulty if it should actually begin to manifest itself.

[stumpjumper]

I'm fine with calling individual experiences, inductions and holistic philosophical views evidence. My problem begins when certain of the religious amongst us begin wielding the conclusions they've drawn from this sort of evidence as if they were scientifically evidenced claims. They are not. No one is necessarily bound by these conclusions, not even the individual who has reached them.

When we use this sort of evidence, which I will admit nealry all (if not all) of us do, it calls for extreme humility and...well...careful and frequent use of the consensus process. Even then we can't really say if we're wrong or right--only that it seems to be (or to have been) working or not working.

Whoops. Sorry. :oops:

I agree. I do not believe there is such a thing as proof or disproof of the existence of God. Most theologians don't either...

I tend to reserve "proofs" for maths and alcohol...

[Kassiana]

My experiences with my husband cause me to love him. I don't expect you to love him because you haven't had the same experiences.

My experiences with the Gods cause me to believe in them. I don't expect you to believe in them because you haven't had the same experiences.

Works for me.

[Glass*Soul]

My experiences with my husband cause me to love him. I don't expect you to love him because you haven't had the same experiences.

My experiences with the Gods cause me to believe in them. I don't expect you to believe in them because you haven't had the same experiences.

Works for me.

I'm coming to the conclusion that this is the one and only apologetic for the existence of any god(s) and that it is doomed to be a apologetic for one.

There is no shared apologetic for this particular question.

Luckily, there is a great deal more to Christianity than the question of the existence of any god(s). That is why I am here. I hope these other things are enough to put me into some degree of fellowship with those whose Christianity does include a belief in a god.

Otherwise I think I am in danger of pining myself into a very bad state.

[seebs]

I'm coming to the conclusion that this is the one and only apologetic for the existence of any god(s) and that it is doomed to be a apologetic for one.

There is no shared apologetic for this particular question.

There is some ability to share it, but there's a bit of difficulty sometimes sorting things out.

Luckily, there is a great deal more to Christianity than the question of the existence of any god(s). That is why I am here. I hope these other things are enough to put me into some degree of fellowship with those whose Christianity does include a belief in a god.

Otherwise I think I am in danger of pining myself into a very bad state.

At my church, the non-theists have taken steps to ensure that traditional Christian members continue to feel welcome, because we're not exactly an overwhelming majority anymore.

[Glass*Soul]

I agree. I do not believe there is such a thing as proof or disproof of the existence of God. Most theologians don't either...

I tend to reserve "proofs" for maths and alcohol...

Interestingly, if the proof of the alcohol is sufficient I tend to begin having expriences of the Divine.

[Glass*Soul]

I'm coming to the conclusion that this is the one and only apologetic for the existence of any god(s) and that it is doomed to be a apologetic for one.

There is no shared apologetic for this particular question.

There is some ability to share it, but there's a bit of difficulty sometimes sorting things out.

We can share activities that tend to bring on certain experiences and we can talk about our experiences, but experiences of the Divine are locked in our heads.

There is nothing we can reference the other person back to.

At my church, the non-theists have taken steps to ensure that traditional Christian members continue to feel welcome, because we're not exactly an overwhelming majority anymore.

Very cool. I like inclusiveness and I don't like seeing people being disenfranchised.

[sparklecat]

My experiences with my husband cause me to love him. I don't expect you to love him because you haven't had the same experiences.

My experiences with the Gods cause me to believe in them. I don't expect you to believe in them because you haven't had the same experiences.

Works for me.

I'm coming to the conclusion that this is the one and only apologetic for the existence of any god(s) and that it is doomed to be a apologetic for one.

There is no shared apologetic for this particular question.

Luckily, there is a great deal more to Christianity than the question of the existence of any god(s). That is why I am here. I hope these other things are enough to put me into some degree of fellowship with those whose Christianity does include a belief in a god.

Otherwise I think I am in danger of pining myself into a very bad state.

Ditto, to all of that.

[seebs]

We can share activities that tend to bring on certain experiences and we can talk about our experiences, but experiences of the Divine are locked in our heads.

There is nothing we can reference the other person back to.

True. This is true of most of the experiences I think are important, in fact; it's true of love, too.

The things that are easy to share are useful, but not necessarily important.